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Abstract
Nowadays, enterprises widely deploy Network Functions (NFs)
and server applications in the cloud. However, processing of
sensitive data and trusted execution cannot be securely de-
ployed in the untrusted cloud. Cloud providers themselves
could accidentally leak private information (e.g., due to mis-
configurations) or rogue users could exploit vulnerabilities
of the providers’ systems to compromise execution integrity,
posing a threat to the confidentiality of internal enterprise
and customer data.
In this paper, we identify (i) a number of NF and server
application use-cases that trusted execution can be applied
to, (ii) the assets and impact of compromising the private
data and execution integrity of each use-case, and (iii) we
leverage Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) architec-
ture to design Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) for
cloud-based NFs and server applications. We combine SGX
with the Data Plane Development KIT (DPDK) to proto-
type and evaluate our TEEs for a number of application
scenarios (Layer 2 frame and Layer 3 packet processing for
plain and encrypted traffic, traffic load-balancing and back-
end server processing). Our results indicate that NFs involv-
ing plain traffic can achieve almost native performance (e.g.,
∼ 22 Million Packets Per Second for Layer 3 forwarding for
64-byte frames), while NFs involving encrypted traffic and
server processing can still achieve competitive performance
(e.g., ∼ 12 Million Packets Per Second for server processing
for 64-byte frames).
1. INTRODUCTION
Network Functions (NFs) deployed on routers, switches,
and middleboxes are a vital part of today’s network infras-
tructure, improving network performance, reliability, avail-
ability, and security. At the same time, large-scale appli-
cations require a large amount of storage and processing
power. Both resources are vital for modern enterprises,
which have to either deploy their own in-house IT infrastruc-
ture or use cloud-based network and server services. Previ-
ous work [45] shows that the latter approach is less expensive
and complicated in terms of management for enterprises,
and more flexible and resilient in case of failures. As a re-
sult, nowadays, NFs and applications are widely deployed
in the cloud and cloud routers, switches, middleboxes, and
servers are commonly used by enterprises.
NFs and applications that maintain private data, process
∗This work is part of the author’s internship at Intel Cor-
poration.
sensitive user data, and require trusted execution cannot
be securely deployed in the untrusted cloud. In a cloud
environment, providers may accidentally leak sensitive user
information (e.g., because of a server misconfiguration) or
malicious users may exploit vulnerabilities of the providers’
systems [3, 1, 4] to compromise execution integrity. Such
concerns about data confidentiality and execution integrity
discourage enterprises from moving their entire operation to
the cloud [42].
Previous work on securing NFs deployed in the cloud has
considered to directly apply network processing over en-
crypted data [46, 29]. In this paper, we explore the approach
of leveraging Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [19,
20] Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) to create Trusted Ex-
ecution Environments (TEEs) for NF and server process-
ing. To prototype our TEEs, we combine SGX with the
Data Plane Development KIT (DPDK) [21], which allows
for rapid prototyping of high-performance data plane ap-
plications. Previous work on combining SGX and DPDK
to provide a secure middlebox framework for cloud-based
NFs [51] does not consider packet switching, server process-
ing, and NFs for the processing of encrypted traffic (e.g.,
VPN endpoints based on IPsec [26] and MACsec capable
switches [41]).
The limited study and experimentation with SGX-based
TEEs for NFs and server processing motivated our work.
We aim to contribute to the further understanding of the
performance and trade-offs of applying SGX to cloud-based
network and server solutions. Our contribution is twofold:
(i) we discuss NF and server processing use-cases, where
SGX can be applied to, and the assets and impact of com-
promising the private data and execution integrity of each
use-case, and (ii) we present and evaluate proof-of-concept
designs for a number of application scenarios (Layer 2 frame
and Layer 3 packet processing for plain and encrypted traf-
fic, traffic load-balancing, and backend server processing)
through an experimental study.
The rest of our work is organized as follows: in section 2,
we give some background on the SGX and DPDK frame-
works and discuss our related work. In section 3, we discuss
NF and server application use-cases, where trusted execu-
tion can be applied to. In section 4, we present our design
approach. Section 5, describes implementation-specific de-
tails of our work, and section 6, presents our experimen-
tal evaluation study. In section 7, we describe the lessons
learned and open issues of the current work that we plan to
address in the future, and, finally, section 8 concludes our
work.
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2. BACKGROUND & RELATEDWORK
In this section, we present a brief overview of SGX and
DPDK to help the reader gain better understanding of what
will be discussed in the rest of the paper. We also discuss
some related work.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 SGX
The Intel SGX architecture offers a set of x86-64 ISA ex-
tensions that enable applications to instantiate a secure soft-
ware container, called an enclave; an area in the virtual
address space of the application, which is protected by the
processor from accesses of any software that does not reside
in it (e.g., other applications, OS, BIOS).
The enclave data is stored in a reserved memory cache,
called Enclave Page Cache (EPC). The Memory Encryption
Engine (MEE) encrypts the enclave data in EPC to avoid
memory attacks (e.g., memory snooping). To access enclave
data in EPC, the processor enters a new CPU mode, called
enclave mode, which applies additional hardware verifica-
tions to each memory access. Specifically, the data in EPC
is decrypted only when entering the CPU package (enclave
mode) and is encrypted again and stored to EPC when leav-
ing the CPU package.
Untrusted code can make incoming calls (ECALLs) to
trusted enclave functions defined and exposed by develop-
ers, while enclave code can make outgoing calls (OCALLs)
to untrusted code. In cases that the enclave execution is in-
terrupted due to asynchronous events, such as interrupts and
exceptions, the processor state is securely saved inside the
enclave to prevent any leakage of secrets. After the event is
serviced, the processor state can be restored and the enclave
execution resumes from the point that was interrupted.
An enclave can prove that it has been properly instanti-
ated on a platform through CPU-based attestation. There
are 2 attestation categories; local and remote. Local attesta-
tion enables 2 enclaves instantiated on the same platform to
authenticate each other, while remote attestation enables an
enclave instantiated on a remote platform to attest that it
is “trusted” to a remote attestation provider, so that secrets
can be provisioned to it [22].
2.1.2 DPDK
DPDK consists of a set of libraries and optimized Net-
work Interface Card (NIC) drivers for highly-scalable and
fast packet processing, which is designed to run on any pro-
cessor. It avoids the overhead imposed by Linux kernel
processing (e.g., system calls, context switching on block-
ing I/O, copying data from kernel to user space, interrupts)
and achieves high performance by: 1) leveraging processor
affinity, 2) allocating huge memory pages to avoid swaps and
reduce TLB misses, 3) placing device drivers in user space to
achieve zero-copy packet processing, 4) accessing all devices
by polling, 5) achieving synchronization without locks, and
6) handling large batches of packets and distributing them
to processing threads for unified processing.
Each DPDK process (application) occupies one CPU core
in full, but can actually use one or more of its logical cores.
To exchange data among logical cores, lock-less First-In-
First-Out (FIFO) ring structures are used. Each application
can make use of DPDK libraries that provide network packet
buffer management and packet forwarding mechanisms, and
implement the TCP/IP protocol stack.
2.2 Related Work
In this section, we discuss software and hardware-based
approaches that protect applications against unauthorized
access. We also present some related work based on SGX
and a few approaches that study the application of NFs
directly to encrypted data.
2.2.1 Software-Based Protection
One of the very first works towards protecting applica-
tions and their sensitive data from unauthorized access by
privileged software is NGSCB [37]. NGSCB made use of vir-
tualization to run trusted and untrusted OSs simultaneously
on the same machine enabling critical applications to use the
trusted OS. A similar approach was also taken by Proxos [50]
that requires application developers to specify which system
calls are sensitive, so that they are forwarded to a trusted
private OS, protecting applications against an untrusted OS.
Approaches, such as Overshadow [13], Virtual Ghost [15]
and InkTag [18], assumed a trusted virtualization layer to
protect sensitive application data and aimed to reduce the
size of TCB. Specifically, Overshadow offers different views
of physical memory for each memory access, therefore, an
application can have a normal view of its resources, but the
OS an encrypted one. While Overshadow focuses on ensur-
ing that applications are isolated from the OS, InkTag al-
lows applications to use the services of an untrusted OS and
define their own access control policies on secure files. Vir-
tual Ghost utilizes compiler support to secure applications
from an untrusted OS and creates secure memory, which
cannot either be read or written by the OS. MiniBox [32] is
a two-way sandbox that protects critical applications from a
malicious OS, as well as an OS from malicious applications.
All these approaches are purely based on software and do
not require any special hardware support. Therefore, they
can be used in cases that hardware-based solutions, such as
SGX, cannot be deployed.
2.2.2 Hardware-Based Protection
Several systems have utilized trusted hardware to secure
applications running on them along with sensitive data from
unauthorized access.
Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) [17] offer a dedicated
micro-controller to offer secure generation of cryptographic
keys and restrict their accessibility. TPMs also support re-
mote attestation and data sealing functions. However, there
are privacy concerns associated with the Direct Anonymous
Attestation (DAA) scheme used by TPM when a small num-
ber of keys is used for the entire platform lifetime [31]. To
address those concerns, SGX extends DAA by using an
Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) key during remote attesta-
tion [22].
Secure co-processors [48, 16] offer hardware that can be
trusted even in cases of physical attacks, so that trusted
computations can be performed on untrusted remote de-
vices. However, they are expensive and their performance is
limited due to thermal throttling issues.
ARM TrustZone [7] is a security technology for System-
on-a-Chip (SoC) and CPU systems based on the concept of
physically separated trusted and untrusted worlds. It has
been used to build an embedded virtualization system on
commodity hardware [38] and a multi-layer security archi-
tecture for mobile devices [30]. TrustZone is mainly used by
embedded systems and does not offer memory encryption,
therefore, attacks are possible in cases of physical DRAM
access.
AMD’s memory encryption technology [23] is integrated
into the x86 CPU architecture and offers a security subsys-
tem for key generation, platform boot, off-chip storage for
sensitive data, protection against physical memory attacks
and support for encrypted virtual machines. However, it
specializes in memory encryption and does not provide a
framework to run applications in trusted mode.
2.2.3 SGX-Based Approaches
SGX offers CPU features that enable applications to in-
stantiate secure and trusted enclaves. Research areas, to
which SGX has been applied, include networked and dis-
tributed systems, cloud systems and applications.
In Network Function Virtualization (NFV) environments,
the design of an enclavized NAT, policy control and intru-
sion detection application, HTTP and web caching proxy [47],
and an extension to enclavize the Click modular router [14]
have been presented. These approaches do not study the
performance and overhead of applying SGX to frame pro-
cessing and trusted encryption/decryption for IPsec and MAC-
sec traffic, while the provided experimental results are lim-
ited.
Designs that explore how SGX could strengthen the secu-
rity and privacy of peer-to-peer anonymity networks, such
as Tor [28, 27], network protocols, such as TLS [8], and dis-
tributed services, such as the Apache ZooKeeper [11], have
been studied. These protocols and services operate on a
higher layer of the TCP/IP protocol stack and the perfor-
mance of pure network forwarding and switching is not eval-
uated. Slick [51] proposes a trusted middlebox framework to
deploy network functions on untrusted servers. This work
tackles a problem related to ours and some of their design
decisions and optimizations can be used to further enhance
our approach and vice versa.
Haven [9] protects the confidentiality and integrity of ap-
plications and their associated data from the untrusted cloud
on which they run, while VC3 [43] allows users to keep their
data and secrets safe during the execution of distributed
MapReduce computations in the cloud. The idea of an in-
verted cloud infrastructure has been discussed [49], where
mini providers use SGX to secure confidential information,
so that they can join forces to provide cloud services in-
stead of receiving services by a single major provider. SGX
has also been used to secure content-based routing mecha-
nisms [39] and Database Management Systems (DBMS) [6]
operating on the cloud. These pieces of work focus on
trusted cloud applications and services running on top of
today’s networks, rather than the performance of the un-
derlying network infrastructure itself.
2.2.4 Network Functions Over Encrypted Data
Starting with APLOMB [45], the idea of out-sourcing NF
processing to the cloud emerged, without taking into ac-
count though its security considerations. BlindBox [46], ex-
tending the approach taken by APLOMB, performs deep
packet inspection directly over encrypted network traffic.
Later on, Embark [29] added support for a wider set of
NFs over encrypted network data. This work focuses ex-
clusively on protecting network traffic through encryption,
rather than investigating how the execution of the NF soft-
ware itself can be secured. Moreover, the studied middle-
boxes operate on the network layer and above, without con-
sidering any link layer devices or server-side applications.
3. TRUSTEDEXECUTIONFORNETWORK
FUNCTIONSAND SERVERAPPLICATIONS
Each application and NF deployment processes is coupled
with private data and executes software vital for its secure
and legitimate operation. We present a few example use
cases along with the assets of each case that can be protected
through SGX in Table 1 to show that trusted execution can
apply to a wide set of systems and applications with different
security concerns. We categorize the assets into data and
data structures, and software. Given that SGX provides
encrypted EPC to each enclave, whose access is forbidden
to any untrusted entity, the data and data structures crucial
for the operation of each use-case can be stored in EPC.
Crucial software pieces can be executed in enclave mode,
fully protected and isolated from the untrusted part of the
system.
To avoid exposing topology information, routing and man-
agement policies to attackers, a router should: 1) protect its
internal data structures (e.g., routing table, Domain Name
Server (DNS) cache, access control lists) by storing them
in EPC, and 2) protect the actual software that performs
operations using those structures (e.g., longest or exact IP
prefix match, DNS cache lookup) by executing it in enclave
mode. To avoid exposing forwarding policy information,
legacy switches can store their forwarding table in EPC and
execute in enclave mode all the operations related to it, while
Software Defined Networking (SDN) switches can protect
their flow table and the related operations from attackers.
The same applies to servers; for instance, DNS servers can
leak information about the mapping of domain names to IP
addresses, therefore, their DNS cache should be stored in
protected enclave memory, while software that performs op-
erations (e.g., lookups, insertions, deletions, updates) over
this cache should be executed in enclave mode. Similarly, in
a cloud multi-tenant environment, a server hosting multiple
Virtual Machines (VMs) can secure each tenant’s applica-
tion instance and data in an enclave.
Middleboxes, such as load balancers and firewalls can re-
veal to attackers load balancing policies and information
about the blocked and accepted traffic respectively. To this
end, they can protect their policies in EPC and enforce them
to incoming traffic in enclave mode.
Since the source and destination IP address of a packet
is typically in plaintext, on-path eavesdroppers can easily
identify its source and destination. In a LAN, any Network
Interface Card (NIC) that is present on it can listen to all
the frames transmitted by any other NIC regardless of their
destination MAC address, identifying the source and desti-
nation MAC address of the frames. To provide end-to-end
security directly at the network and link layer of TCP/IP,
security extensions have been added to the legacy IP and
MAC protocols, formulated as the IPsec and MACsec pro-
tocols respectively. VPN endpoints and MACsec-capable
switches make use of those protocols to encrypt network
packets and Ethernet frames respectively. Since traffic en-
cryption and authentication keys can be leaked, they should
be stored in EPC, while encryption and authentication op-
erations should be executed in enclave mode.
We should note that the size of EPC is currently limited
to 128MB across all the enclaves, therefore, the data to be
stored in it should be carefully selected. Exceeding the EPC
size results in EPC paging (a mechanism for secure paging to
the unprotected memory supported by SGX), which imposes
additional execution performance overhead. We discuss how
the performance impact from EPC paging can be alleviated
in section 7.2.
4. DESIGN
Our design consists of 2 major building blocks: DPDK
and SGX. We first present a baseline approach utilizing a
DPDK application and a single SGX packet processing en-
clave as well as the work-flow facilitated by this approach.
We also present an approach to scale trusted processing and
an approach to implement a trusted processing pipeline by
leveraging multiple local enclaves and the SGX local attes-
tation feature.
4.1 Baseline Approach
Following the SGX application design principles [19], we
divide our DPDK application into 2 parts; trusted, which
is implemented within a processing enclave to protect vital
data structures and code against unauthorized access, and
untrusted, which refers to application code not protected by
SGX. Our baseline design approach is illustrated in Figure 1.
The enclave is assigned to a dedicated logical core, while one
or more logical cores are assigned to the untrusted part of
the application. The code integrity inside an enclave can be
authenticated through the SGX remote attestation feature
mentioned in section 2.1.1.
Initially, packets are received by the untrusted part of the
application through one or more receiving (Rx) queues and
are placed in DPDK buffers. The memory address (pointer)
of each buffer is enqueued to a receiving (Rx) DPDK ring.
The enclave repeatedly dequeues pointers from the Rx ring,
so that the buffers are processed by a secure module within
the enclave. Once processing is done, the buffer pointers are
enqueued to a transmission (Tx) DPDK ring. The untrusted
application part dequeues them from the transmission ring
and transmits the buffers through one or more transmission
(Tx) queues. We use the user-space DPDK I/O mechanisms
to read buffers from the NICs and enqueue/dequeue them
to/from the Rx, and Tx rings, since such libraries have been
specifically optimized for high traffic rates.
This design can be used for programmable routing and
switching applications. Our experimental results (section 6.2.1)
indicate that such trusted application models based on this
design can achieve forwarding performance of ∼ 22 million
packets/frames per second for 64-byte frames.
4.2 Parallel Packet Processing Approach
Depending on the requirements of each application, an
enclave might have to perform costly operations, which can
result in considerable performance degradation. To enable
applications to scale their performance in such cases, mul-
tiple processing enclaves that operate in parallel can be in-
stantiated (transition from sequential to parallel process-
ing). To this end, in Figure 2, we present our design ap-
proach to scale packet processing by utilizing multiple SGX
enclaves, which implement the same processing logic within
the same DPDK application. The integrity of the code exe-
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cuted by each enclave can be authenticated through remote
attestation. Similar to section 4.1, a separate logical core
is assigned to each enclave, while the untrusted part of the
application may be assigned one or more logical cores. Each
enclave dequeues buffer pointers from the Rx ring and pro-
cesses the associated buffers. Finally, it enqueues the buffer
pointers to the Tx ring for transmission.
This design can be used for multi-threaded applications
and systems (e.g., load-balancers, spark, hadoop and other
data processing systems) and, more general, in scenarios,
where a single processing enclave results in low performance
(e.g., because of EPC paging). Such example scenarios are
the processing of encrypted L2 and L3 traffic (similar to
MACSec and IPSec) presented in sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3,
where this design achieves a performance gain of 3-4x com-
pared to the baseline sequential design.
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Table 1: Example Use-Cases & SGX Protection
Use-case
Assets Protection through
SGXData and Structures Software
Network Router
Routing table, DNS cache
Access control lists
Forwarding logic, longest prefix match,
DNS cache and routing table operations
Data stored in EPC
Software executed in
enclave mode
Network Switch Forwarding table Forwarding table operations
Firewall Policy rules Rule lookup and match
Load Balancer Load balancing rules Rule lookup and match
DNS Server DNS cache DNS cache related operations
Server hosting VMs Tenant’s data Tenant’s application instances
VPN Endpoint (IPsec)
Encryption and
authentication keys
Encryption and
authentication operations
MACsec-Capable Switch
Encryption and
authentication keys,
forwarding table
Encryption, authentication
and forwarding table operations
SDN-Capable Switch Flow table Flow table operations, forwarding logic
4.3 Packet Processing Pipeline Approach
In Figure 3, we present the design of a secure packet
processing pipeline design consisting of a number of stages.
Each stage applies a specific action to packets and forwards
them to the subsequent processing stage, and is implemented
as a separate SGX enclave. The code integrity of the first
stage enclave is authenticated through remote attestation,
while each next stage enclave and its previous one authenti-
cates each other and establishes a protected communication
channel through local attestation. Each stage enclave is as-
signed to a separate logical core.
The first stage enclave dequeues buffer pointers from the
Rx ring and initiates secure processing. The result of the
first stage processing will be the input of the second stage
and so on, so forth. The final processing stage of the pipeline
enqueues the processed buffer pointers to the Tx ring for
transmission.
This design can be used in networking and systems en-
vironments that require an action sequence to be applied
to received packets, such as Software Defined Networking
(SDN) switches [34], Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) sys-
tems [5], and cloud applications following the microservice
architecture [35]. We expect that it would allow for more
flexible and diverse processing than the previous approaches,
but the performance evaluation of this design is left to our
future work.
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4.4 Threat Model
We focus on cases, where systems and applications may
process confidential information, therefore they leverage trusted
execution to secure crucial data and perform critical pro-
cessing operations. Such cases can occur either in an un-
trusted cloud setup due to an accidental leak of confidential
information or malicious tenants that try to compromise the
execution integrity of others, or in setups, where resources
are distributed at the edge of the network. Similar to the
use-cases mentioned in section 3, attackers may attempt to
learn routing and forwarding policies, compromise encryp-
tion and authentication keys, monitor encrypted traffic, etc.
According to the SGX threat model [33], we assume that
an attacker can compromise software components, includ-
ing privileged code (e.g., OS and BIOS) and launch physical
attacks.
Following the SGX threat model [33] and prior related
work [27, 28], DoS and DDoS attacks are out of the scope
of our work, since compromised software or hardware can
deny the service at any point of the execution (e.g., restart
or crash the system or flush all the unprotected DPDK mem-
ory). The same assumption applies to side channel attacks
against SGX (e.g., page fault and cache-based side channel
attacks). Software techniques to protect SGX-capable ap-
plications against attacks aiming to exploit bugs (e.g., buffer
overflows, synchronization bugs, etc.) [52, 44] are also out of
the scope of our work.
5. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe implementation-specific details
on our effort to combine DPDK and SGX, as well as the
developed application scenarios.
5.1 Combining DPDK and SGX
We used DPDK version 17.02 and implemented our appli-
cations as enclaves using SGX version 1.8. To make the en-
clave ECALL/OCALL API accessible to DPDK context, we
had to first compile the enclavized application and then com-
pile the DPDK context, which was using the enclave API as
a shared library. To be able to make use of more DPDK con-
text in enclave mode, we had to modify the DPDK codebase
to alleviate its coupling with standard C libraries (e.g., by
modifying functions for log collection and printing, convert-
ing inline functions to macros), since SGX currently sup-
ports only the use of memory allocation and deallocation
standard C libraries in enclave mode. However, in some
cases, the coupling was so tight (e.g., DPDK libraries for
hash and flow table implementation and lookup) that a spe-
cific OCALL had to be executed. We discuss further details
and our optimization to alleviate this additional overhead
for such cases in section 5.2.
The API of our application enclaves exposes a single ECALL,
which is required to be called only once during the enclave
instantiation. No further ECALLs are required during the
execution, since the communication between DPDK and the
enclave is achieved through DPDK rings, a structure opti-
mized for performance. Most of the developed codebase,
including all the performance-sensitive enclave components,
is written in C instead of C++ for compatibility with the
DPDK codebase and performance purposes.
5.2 Application Scenarios
We implemented a few DPDK application scenarios to
experiment with. The enclavized components of each appli-
cation scenario are summarized in Table 2.
Layer 2 (L2) forwarding: A frame processing applica-
tion implementing the operation of a network switch. We
use a single processing enclave for the trusted applications
following the design of section 4.1. The untrusted applica-
tion part receives frames, which enqueues to the Rx ring.
The processing enclave dequeues frames from this ring and
performs a number of frame sanity checks, destination MAC
address lookup and source MAC address rewriting. Once
processing is done, the enclave enqueues the frames to the
Tx ring.
Layer 3 (L3) forwarding: A packet processing applica-
tion implementing the operation of a network router. The
enclave operations include a few packet header sanity checks
and the longest prefix match lookup of the destination ad-
dress of a packet.
Encrypted L2 forwarding: A frame processing appli-
cation for encrypted Ethernet traffic implementing the op-
eration of a MACsec-capable switch. We use the frame
format of MACsec [41], where the Integrity Check Value
(ICV) field consists of an 128-byte CMAC hash, and mul-
tiple processing enclaves following the design of section 4.2.
The untrusted application part receives encrypted frames,
which are enqueued to a processing enclave. A processing
enclave dequeues and decrypts them, while it also generates
the ICV of the raw frame data and compares it with the
ICV of the received frames to verify their integrity. If the
integrity verification is successful, the raw frames are pro-
cessed (MAC table lookup and MAC address rewriting) and
their new ICV is generated. Finally, the enclave encrypts
the processed frames and enqueues them to the Tx ring to
be forwarded.
Encrypted L3 forwarding: A packet processing appli-
cation for encrypted network level traffic implementing the
operation of a VPN endpoint (router). We use multiple
processing enclaves following the design of section 4.2 and
the packet format provided by the ”Encapsulating Security
Payload” function of IPsec [26], where the Integrity Check
Value (ICV) field consists of an 128-byte CMAC hash. The
workflow is similar to the one explained for the encrypted
L2 forwarding application.
Load-balancing & backend server processing: An
application implementing the operation of a load balancer
distributing traffic to multiple backend server processes (ei-
ther VMs or containers) running on the same physical ma-
chine. The load-balancing process that maintains a flow
table (with 1 million flow entries) and classifies the received
packets into flows based on their destination IP address. The
backend server processes filter and forward the distributed
packets based on their destination IP address (hash-based
forwarding). The load balancer forwards traffic to the back-
end processes through a number of DPDK rings (one ring
per backend process).
An enclave of a load balancing or server process has to
make an explicit OCALL for every batch of packets de-
queued from the Rx ring. The vanilla DPDK application
uses DPDK libraries for the flow table and the hash table
lookups that leverage standard C libraries, which are not
trusted and cannot be used in enclave mode. To allow the
DPDK libraries to access the enclave buffer containing the
keys for the lookups, this buffer has to be copied during
the OCALL transition from the enclave’s EPC to untrusted
memory. To return the lookup results back to the enclave, a
separate buffer has to be copied from the untrusted memory
to the enclave’s EPC when the OCALL returns. In addi-
tion to the copy operation itself, additional checks have to
be performed by SGX to ensure that the full memory range
of the buffers passed to the untrusted application part is
within the enclave.
To enhance system performance and alleviate overheads,
we performed the following optimizations:
• Increased the number of packets dequeued as batch by a
server or load balancing enclave from its corresponding
ring to reduce the total number of performed OCALLs.
• Used untrusted memory for the buffers of the lookup keys
and results to avoid memory copy from/to the EPC and
the additional checks. Essentially, we traded security for
performance, as explained in section 7.1.
• According to the design presented in section 4.2, we en-
abled each backend process to instantiate two enclaves
implementing the same processing logic.
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Figure 4: Experimental Setup
6. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We first discuss our experimental setup, methodology and
workload and then present the results of our study to eval-
uate the performance and the SGX related overhead of our
design for the application scenarios mentioned in Section 5.2.
6.1 Experimental Setup
Testbed: For our experimental evaluation, we use a testbed
consisting of 2 machines (Figure 4). On the first one, we run
Table 2: Enclavized Components For Each Application Scenario
Application Enclavized Components
L2 Forwarding (Plain Traffic)
Sanity check, MAC address lookup,
MAC address rewriting
L3 Forwarding (Plain Traffic) Sanity Check, longest prefix match lookup
L2 Forwarding (Encrypted Traffic)
Frame decryption, sanity check, frame integrity check,
MAC address lookup, MAC address rewriting,
ICV generation, frame encryption
L3 Forwarding (Encrypted Traffic)
Packet decryption, sanity check, packet integrity check,
longest prefix match lookup, ICV generation, packet encryption
Load Balancer
Packet processing before and after
flow table lookup
Back-end Server
Packet processing before and after
hash table lookup for hash-based forwarding
the DPDK packet generator (version 3.2) and on the second
one, the application under test (trusted and vanilla DPDK
applications). Each machine is equipped with an Intel Xeon
CPU E3-1240L v5 (2.10GHz, 4 cores), 32GB of RAM, and
a dual-port Intel XL710 40GbE NIC. The NIC is connected
to the processor on each machine through a PCIe Gen3 x8
bus. Each of port 0 and port 1 of the generator is connected
to port 0 and port 1 respectively of the application under
test through a 40 GbE Ethernet link.
Methodology: The packet generator creates traffic of
variable size (64 to 1500-byte frames or up to the size that
saturates the available link capacity) and sends it through
port 0 of its NIC to port 0 of the application’s NIC. The
application processes the received traffic and forwards it
through port 1 of its NIC to port 1 of the packet genera-
tor’s NIC. The performance is quantified by measuring the
received packet rate in Million Packets Per Second (MPPS)
and throughput in Gbps at port 1 of the packet generator’s
NIC. We run each experiment 10 times (each experiment’s
duration is 1 minute) and we report on the average results
among the runs, since the run-to-run result variation is neg-
ligible.
To calculate the SGX overhead, we use the following equa-
tion, where the “Vanilla App (MPPS)” term refers to the
measured MPPS processed by the vanilla DPDK application
and the “SGX App (MPPS)” term to the measured MPPS
processed by the trusted DPDK application:
Overhead(%) =
V anillaApp(MPPS)− SGXApp(MPPS)
V anillaApp(MPPS)
∗ 100
Workload: For this initial evaluation of our design, we
use a synthetic traffic workload rather than real-world traf-
fic traces for 2 reasons: 1) to study the impact of gradually
greater sizes of traffic patterns to the SGX performance, and
2) to stress on the specific fields and layer of the TCP/IP
protocol stack that processing and forwarding are based on
for each scenario. For the L3 related and the load balancing
& server processing scenarios, our workload consists of traf-
fic flows with 1 million distinct source and destination IP
addresses, and the MAC address of the generator’s and ap-
plication’s port 0 as source and destination respectively. For
the L2 related scenarios, our workload consists of 1 million
distinct source and destination MAC addresses.
6.2 Experimental Results
6.2.1 L2 & L3 Forwarding
In Figure 5, we present the performance overhead of a
trusted L2 and L3 forwarding application compared to the
corresponding vanilla DPDK L2 and L3 forwarding appli-
cation. For 64-byte frames, the overhead is ∼ 2.1% and
∼ 1.8%, while it decreases to ∼ 1.8% and ∼ 1.2% for 128-
byte frames respectively. When we increase the frame size
to 256 and 512 bytes, the transmission and reception delays
become the bottleneck of the overall system, therefore, the
performance of the trusted application reaches the perfor-
mance of the vanilla one.
In Table 3, we present the performance (in MPPS) and
the achieved wire throughput (determined by the illustrated
frame size plus 8 bytes of preamble and 12 bytes of inter-
frame gap) for both the vanilla and the trusted applications.
For small-sized frames, we cannot saturate the available link
capacity, because the NICs are limited by the current CPU
power per core, which is not sufficient for our network band-
width. Similar results have been presented by DPDK per-
formance evaluation studies with similar setup [24, 25]. As
the frame size increases, our applications are required to for-
ward fewer frames, while we approach the saturation of the
available bandwidth for 512-byte frames.
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Figure 5: Trusted L2 & L3 Forwarding Overhead
6.2.2 Encrypted L2 Forwarding
In this scenario, we vary the number of enclaves used for
the processing of encrypted L2 traffic. Our goal through
this experiment is not to replicate the cipher suite used by
Table 3: L2 & L3 Forwarding Performance & Wire Throughput
Frame Size (Bytes) Performance (MPPS)/Wire Throughput (Gbps)
L2 Forwarding L3 Forwarding
Vanilla Trusted Vanilla Trusted
64 21.80/14.65 21.33/14.33 21.89/14.71 21.50/14.45
128 21.34/25.30 20.95/24.80 21.45/25.30 21.19/25.09
256 13.75/30.37 13.75/30.36 13.83/30.54 13.84/30.56
512 8.67/36.91 8.68/36.93 8.68/36.93 8.68/36.93
MACsec or the specifics of the protocol, but rather study a
trusted application that uses the mechanisms provided by
SGX for encryption/decryprtion.
In Figure 6 and 7, we present the performance (MPPS)
and the wire throughput (Gbps) respectively of trusted L2
forwarding for encrypted traffic. The results show that the
system performance is low, however, it scales as we increase
the number of enclaves. The potential bottlenecks in this
scenario can be: 1) the SGX encryption/decryption over-
head, and 2) the integrity verification process and the new
ICV generation. To further investigate these bottlenecks, we
repeated the same experiment without performing integrity
verification and ICV generation to focus on the overhead of
the SGX encryption/decryption. The results are presented
in Figure 8 and 9. We observe that we achieve a speedup
of ∼ 2.2x, however, the results do not approach the ones
for plain traffic. Therefore, we can conclude that the per-
formance is dominated by the SGX encryption/decryption
overhead.
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6.2.3 Encrypted L3 Forwarding
In this scenario, we vary the number of enclaves used for
the processing of encrypted L3 traffic. In Figure 10 and 11,
we present the performance (MPPS) and the achieved wire
throughput (Gbps) respectively. The performance is again
low, but it scales as we increase the number of enclaves.
To further investigate the performance bottleneck, we re-
peated the same experiment without performing integrity
verification and ICV generation. The results were similar
to section 6.2.2, achieving the same speedup of ∼ 2.2x, and
leading us to the conclusion that the system bottleneck is
again the SGX encryption/decryption.
6.2.4 Load Balancing & Backend Server Processing
In Figure 12 and 13, we present the overhead of using
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Figure 7: Trusted L2 Forwarding Wire Throughput – En-
crypted Traffic
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
64 128 256 512 1024 1500
M
PP
S
Frame	Size	(Bytes)
Trusted	L2	Forwarding	Performance	- Encrypted	Traffic
(No	integrity	check	&	ICV	generation)
1	Enclave
2	Enclaves
3	Enclaves
4	Enclaves
5	Enclaves
Figure 8: Trusted L2 Forwarding Performance – Encrypted
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trusted and untrusted memory for the lookup key and re-
sult buffers respectively (i.e., with and without copying the
buffer memory during OCALLs). For trusted memory, 4
bytes are copied from EPC to untrusted memory and 1 byte
from untrusted memory to EPC per packet for load balanc-
ing and 4 bytes from EPC to untrusted memory and vice
versa per packet for server processing.
We observe that for load balancing only (no server pro-
cesses running), the SGX overhead is ∼ 10.1% and ∼ 6.5%
for 64-byte frames, and slightly decreases to ∼ 9.7% and
∼ 6.2% for 128-byte frames (use of trusted and untrusted
memory respectively). As we increase the number of server
processes, the overhead increases and the performance de-
grades, since more enclaves have to run on the same phys-
ical machine and the number of performed OCALLs per
dequeued packet batch doubles (one OCALL by the load
balancing enclave and one by the corresponding server en-
clave).
In Tables 4 and 5, we present the performance (MPPS)
and the achieved wire throughput (Gbps) for both the vanilla
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and trusted applications. As we increase the frame size,
our applications are able to process fewer frames, while the
achieved throughput approaches the maximum link capac-
ity.
7. DISCUSSION
In this section, we summarize the lessons we have learned
through our work, and identify a number of open issues that
we are planning to address in our future work.
7.1 Lessons Learned
Our work highlighted a number of important technical
points that we would like to share with the broader commu-
nity. There is a clear trade-off between building a secure and
trusted system and the performance that this system can
achieve even in cases that execution integrity is directly inte-
grated into its architecture. There are many different threat
models and attack scenarios; building a system that provides
confidentiality and security against multiple attack scenarios
at the same time comes with a performance penalty.
Our experimental evaluation indicted that there is a con-
siderable ECALL/OCALL transition performance overhead.
Transferring code execution from/to enclave mode to/from
the untrusted application part does not come for free, since
multiple hardware-level checks have to be performed. For
example, as described in section 6.2.4, enclavized applica-
tions that require access to standard C libraries (other than
the memory allocation and deallocation libraries, which are
the only ones supported by SGX in enclave mode) have to in-
voke explicit OCALLs, which impacts their performance. To
achieve better amortized transition performance, the num-
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ber of ECALLs and OCALLs should be minimized and en-
sure that the application executes work inside the enclave
for as long as possible.
Multiple checks are also performed in the case of memory
copy to/from EPC during ECALLs and OCALLs. As shown
in section 6.2.4, such checks impose an additional perfor-
mance penalty of 5-10%. One way to overcome this penalty
is the use of untrusted memory by an enclave to avoid copy-
ing memory from/to EPC for ECALLs and OCALLs which,
however, raises certain security concerns; the data in the
untrusted memory is not encrypted and can potentially be
accessible by malicious actors, thus leaking enclave secrets,
while it can also be altered at any point of the execution
without notice.
7.2 Open Issues
In our current work, we focused on evaluating the perfor-
mance and trade-offs of the baseline and packet processing
scaling design approaches (sections 4.1 and 4.2). The evalua-
tion of our packet processing pipeline approach (section 4.3),
which could be used for the design of SDN-capable switches,
DPI systems and cloud applications using the microservice
architecture, is left to our future work. To conduct further
evaluation, we would also like to use workloads consisting of
real-world traffic traces, such as the CAIDA anonymized
Internet traces [2] for backbone Internet traffic, and the
IMC 2010 Data Center Measurements [10] for cloud and
data center traffic, more trusted server applications, such as
Hadoop and Spark, and traffic loading balancing algorithms
that could boost performance [40, 12].
Table 4: Load Balancing & Backend Server Processing - Performance & Wire Throughput (0 & 5 Servers)
Frame Size (Bytes) Performance (MPPS) / Wire Throughput (Gbps)
0 Servers 5 Servers
Vanilla
Trusted
(No Buffer
Copy)
Trusted
(Buffer
Copy)
Vanilla
Trusted
(No Buffer
Copy)
Trusted
(Buffer
Copy)
64 17.51/11.76 16.37/11.00 15.73/10.57 16.51/11.09 11.88/7.98 9.96/6.69
128 17.38/20.58 16.31/19.31 15.68/18.56 16.39/19.41 11.83/14.01 9.90/11.72
256 14.17/31.29 14.18/31.30 14.18/33.31 14.17/31.30 11.79/26.03 9.80/21.65
512 8.99/38.26 8.98/38.23 8.98/38.24 8.99/38.28 8.99/38.27 8.99/38.27
Table 5: Load Balancing & Backend Server Processing - Performance & Wire Throughput (10 & 15 Servers)
Frame Size (Bytes) Performance (MPPS) / Wire Throughput (Gbps)
10 Servers 15 Servers
Vanilla
Trusted
(No Buffer
Copy)
Trusted
(Buffer
Copy)
Vanilla
Trusted
(No Buffer
Copy)
Trusted
(Buffer
Copy)
64 16.43/11.04 11.68/7.85 9.74/6.55 16.37/11.00 11.56/7.77 9.50/6.38
128 16.32/19.33 11.64/13.79 9.69/11.47 16.30/19.30 11.52/13.64 9.46/11.20
256 14.17/31.30 11.50/25.40 9.64/21.29 14.17/31.29 11.46/25.30 9.42/20.81
512 8.99/38.30 8.99/38.30 8.99/38.30 8.99/38.25 8.98/38.22 8.98/38.23
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To eliminate the need of invoking explicit OCALLs to
access standard C libraries, we are planning to implement
trusted standard C-like libraries, which should boost the
overall system performance. In cases that the enclave size
and the required protected data and software exceeds the
maximum EPC size, exit-less services [36] can be used to
alleviate the enclave exit overhead imposed by EPC pag-
ing. This is achieved by creating a secure virtual memory
abstraction that implements application-level paging inside
the enclave.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented proof-of-concept designs of
TEEs for NFs and server applications deployed on the un-
trusted cloud. Our designs are based on Intel SGX, which we
combine with DPDK to prototype high-performance trusted
applications. Through this work, we learned several valu-
able lessons and identified remaining open issues, which we
shared with the broader community. Our experimental eval-
uation showed that NFs involving plain traffic can achieve
close to native performance, while NFs involving encrypted
traffic and server processing can still achieve competitive
performance.
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